

25 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Report of Ad Hoc Scientific and Technological Committee

1. I appreciate the opportunity which [ ] has given me to review the draft Report. Although I realize that I don't have all the background on this problem or the benefit of the many discussions, I would like to give you the following thoughts for whatever help they might be. Obviously they would need to be studied and elaborated a good deal further, but if carefully worked out would probably be practicable and acceptable.

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2. Allocation of responsibilities - It is my belief that present allocations are insufficient in three respects:

a. There is undue duplication or triplication between the three military intelligence agencies. From the lists appended to the tabs to the Report it seems that there is a body of technical military subjects which could best be attacked in a unified technical branch, much as OSI and AFOIN have combined on aircraft intelligence. The chief of such a branch might perhaps be a Brigadier General reporting to Partridge.

b. In the Army there seems to be an inadequate relationship between G-2 and the Intelligence Branches of the several Technical Services (Chemical Corps, Signal Corps, etc.). Perhaps CIA or the IAC could give G-2 an assist in establishing a more direct relationship over these units.

c. The activities of OSI would be on a much firmer foundation and hence better accepted in the community if they were based on an NSC directive. They can perhaps be legalistically justified now as "staff" intelligence in support of the DCI's responsibility for "national" intelligence. This argument, however, could also be used (and disputed) in the economic, political, and other intelligence fields. It is doubtful if all of OSI's present or proposed work would be considered "national" intelligence. It is suggested that the NSC be asked to set OSI formally up in business in the field of "scientific intelligence on fundamental research, scientific resources and medicine" under paragraph 101(a)(4) and (5) of the 1947 Act.

3. Coordination of Scientific and Technological Intelligence -

It is my feeling that it would be a mistake to try to divide this field between "departmental" and "national" intelligence. The draft report shows that "scientific" intelligence is (except in the field of scientific OS or resources) quite helpless without information on technical application. Scientific intelligence becomes understandable and significant for the national security only in terms of the technical and usually military application of the research it reports. Conversely technical intelligence can be accurate and foresighted only if constantly in touch with the latest scientific developments and with economists who can assist in determining rates of production.

4. It is my suggestion that rather than force an artificial division between the scientific and technological areas by establishing separate coordinating mechanisms for the two, we recognize that both interests would best be served by a single mechanism and that the largest share of the field belongs to the military technical people. This reasoning would lead to the establishment of a single "Technological and Scientific Intelligence Committee" under the permanent chairmanship of the head of the unified technical intelligence branch proposed in paragraph 2.a. This committee should be responsive to the IAC as well as the JIC. It should have members from OSI and ORR. It should deal with both activities and opinion and be able to set up subcommittees as required but at least to include the five working committees listed in the draft Report. These committees should report directly to the IAC or JIC, however, unless an activities question was involved or coordination of the work of several subcommittees was required. It would not seem to be necessary for State to be a member of this committee although they might be given an observer status. The AEC should have a voice when subjects of concern to it come up.

5. It seems to me that such a system would allow CIA, without sitting in the chair itself, to see that the scientific and technological fields were properly coordinated. Our members on the TSIC and the working committees would be in a position to see at close hand the work of the military service and so could check any suspected errors or bias.

6. It is believed that this system could avoid the present failings of the SIC which are said to be due to lack of authority of its members both with regard to activities and opinion. In my view these failings, to the extent that they caused SIC's failure could be corrected by insuring that major projects of the TSIC and the working committees are referred to the IAC or JIC for approval in the same way that a non-technical estimate would be.

7. The real key to the success of any committee, especially in the scientific and technical area, is who runs it and how. Every effort should be made to hand-pick the key people and to prevent overformalization. In this connection there is attached for what it is worth an analysis prepared with the assistance of [redacted] of the key points in ORR's apparent success with the EIC. (TAB A)

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8. Proposed IAC Activities Subcommittee - I do not understand the need for establishing this committee. As nearly as I can tell it will be almost identical in composition and purpose with the old IAC Standing Committee, which has been abolished at the suggestion of the military (See IAC-D-15). I agree that the members of this group are the proper ones to discuss the coordination of activities, but I don't believe it would be particularly helpful to have a formal committee to accomplish this. The committee mechanism is frequently a time-consuming one particularly if all the agencies are not concerned with all the problems. OIC believes that activities can be better coordinated on an ad hoc basis either bilaterally or multilaterally as the case demands. Minutes and formality tend to detract from the result. Certainly there is no reason to prevent DD/I or OIC from calling a meeting of the people in question at any time that it seems advisable. Further we have found that the most effective agency representatives will differ from case to case - sometimes a collector, sometimes a specialist and sometimes a production man. Whenever we are in doubt the "plans and policies" men are our initial point of contact but they usually pass us on fairly rapidly to the persons more directly responsible for the matter at hand.

9. I can readily see that it might be desirable to have a committee composed of the Chiefs of Production in the several agencies in order to make progress on the coordination and rationalization of the community's production programs. This requires, however, the Allan Evans, Colonel Porter type rather than the Truheart and Pinkneys - (no reflection on them; their jobs are different.)

10. It may also be advisable at a later date to establish some mechanism for bringing the collectors together. This possibility was raised very informally and tentatively by State in connection with the working out of collection problems arising from ONS's proposed series of "gap" papers.

11. Terms of Reference for committees - I have not had time to go through the proposed terms of reference of the several committees proposed in the draft Report. If you decide to go ahead with them as presently outlined I would recommend that they be thoroughly and carefully considered. It is my feeling that they are now too formal - especially in the designation of members. The election of chairman is also a questionable practice if it can be avoided. I am of course available in this regard if you wish to call on me.

  
Acting Assistant Director  
Intelligence Coordination

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Enclosure: TAB A

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